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This paper studies the optimal long-run public intervention in a two-period OLG model where 
the probability of surviving the first period and the length of the second period can be 
influenced by distinct policies. While the optimal size of public intervention depends on the 
extra-productivity of public spendings in longevity, its optimal structure is determined by (1) 
differences in the productivity of each policy; (2) how growth would influence each longevity 
aspect under laissez-faire; (3) the dependence of each longevity aspect on past achievements. 
Given competing effects, the optimal intervention can hardly, under additive expected 
lifetime utility, be strongly unbalanced. 
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The second part of the 20th century being characterized, in industrialized coun-
tries, by the coexistence of a substantial lengthening of life and a strong economic
growth, it does not come as a surprise that economists have paid a particular
attention to the relationship between economic growth and longevity.
Besides the numerous econometric studies on the growth-longevity relation-
ship, longevity has been also introduced recently in growth models, in order to
study the various eﬀects of the length of life on accumulation processes, and,
hence, on economic expansion.3Whereas pioneer models examined the eﬀects of
mortality on accumulation and growth while taking survival conditions as ex-
ogenous (see Ehrlich and Lui, 1991; de la Croix and Licandro, 1999; Pecchenino
and Utendorf, 1999; Zhang et al, 2001; Boucekkine et al, 2002), a more recent
group of models postulated endogenous survival conditions in order to be able
to analyze the reciproqual relationships between prosperity and longevity (see
Chakraborty, 2004; Aisa and Pueyo, 2004; Bhattacharya and Qiao, 2005; Finlay,
2005; Pestieau et al, 2006).
Despite their diﬀerences, all those models aimed at emphasizing that, while
survival conditions, by aﬀecting the temporal horizon of individuals, inﬂuence
their investment decisions (in physical and human capitals) - and thus growth
-, factors aﬀecting accumulation and growth also inﬂuence, via several distinct
channels, survival conditions. Those channels may take the form of health-
enhancing public expenditures (as in Chakraborty, 2004), or of health-enhancing
private spendings (as in Pestieau et al, 2006), or of both (as in Bhattacharya
and Qiao, 2005), private and public spendings completementing each other.
This paper shares with the existing literature the goal of examining the
growth-longevity relationship: its aim is, in a ﬁrst stage, to study, within a
two-period OLG model, the impact of public policy on growth and longevity,
and, in a second stage, to examine the deﬁnition of the optimal long-run public
intervention in an economy where longevity is endogenous and can be aﬀected by
public policy. However, this study diﬀers from the literature on three grounds.
Firstly, whereas existing models introduce longevity either under the form
of a probability of survival from one period of life to another (as in Chakraborty,
2004), or under the form of a second period of life whose length is a fraction of
unity (as in Bhattacharya and Qiao, 2005), the present paper aims at modeling
both the proportion of survivors and the maximum length of life. Such a model-
ing is required to be able to describe the actual evolution of survival conditions,
which, as shown by Figure 1 in the case of France, involves both a rise in the
proportion of people reaching high ages for a ﬁxed maximum age at death (i.e.
the rectangularization process) and a rise of the maximum age at death (i.e.
a shift of the survival curve to the right).4 As demographers emphasized, the
rectangularization process and the rise in the maximum length of life are two
3On empirical studies, see Preston (1975, 1980), Anand and Ravallion (1993), Pritchett
and Summers (1996), Easterlin (1999), and Lichtenberg (2002).
4On the measurement of the rectangularization phenomenon, see Wilmoth and Horiuchi
(1999), and Vallin and Berlinguer (2002).
3distinct phenomena, which did not occur at the same periods and with the same
intensities, so that these may be inﬂuenced by diﬀerent factors.5 In particular,
public intervention may aﬀect those two aspects of longevity in diﬀerent ways,
so that the study of optimal policy requires to distinguish those phenomena.
Secondly, the present paper, contrary to most existing models where the
intervention of the government takes a single form, introduces the distinction
between two kinds of public policies: on the one hand, “pure survival” expen-
ditures, which aﬀect the proportion of a cohort who survives the ﬁrst period
(e.g. public programs promoting security on roads); on the other hand, “pure
longevity” expenditures, aﬀecting the length of life of the people surviving the
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Figure 1: Period survival curves, men and women, France.
Thirdly, while existing models assume no dependence of longevity achieve-
ments on the past, a dependence on the past is postulated in this paper, in the
sense that a stock of common knowledge and customs on “how to live a healthy
5For instance, Wilmoth and Horiuchi (1999) and Wilmoth et al (2000) emphasized that,
in the case of Sweden, the rectangularization took place mostly between 1860 and the 1950s,
whereas the maximum age at death started growing in a stronger way in the late 1960s.
Regarding the various causes of rectangularization, see Nusselder and Mackenbach (1996).
4life”, which aﬀects longevity positively, is supposed to be accumulated and trans-
mitted across generations.6 The existence of some dependency - via customs -
on past longevity achievements does not imply that mortality is not aﬀected by
“one-shoot” policies, which have to be implemented repeatedly. Hence, mortal-
i t yi sh e r es u p p o s e dt ob ed e t e r m i n e db o t hb yp a s ta c h i e v e m e n t sand by current
policies.
In order to study the optimal size and structure of public intervention in an
economy where the probability of survival from the ﬁrst period to the second
period and the length of the second period can be aﬀected by distinct public
policies, we shall, for analytical convenience, rely on a simpliﬁed model, where
the production process only involves a unique generation of same-age individu-
als, unlike in human capital vintage models, such as Boucekkine et al (2002),
where longevity is exogenous. Moreover, unlike in Pestieau et al (2006), there
is no private investment in health decision: individuals cannot here aﬀect their
longevity.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a two-period OLG
model where the probability of surviving the ﬁrst period is endogenous, while
the length of the second period is ﬁxed. This basic model is used to study
the tax rate maximizing steady-state utility. Section 3 presents an extended
framework, where the maximum length of life is endogenous. The optimal long-
run allocation of governmental budget is then examined. Section 4 concludes.
2 The basic model
2.1 Environment
Let us consider a simple two-period OLG model with identical households within
each generation. Each generation is denoted by its time of birth.
All individuals of a generation t live the ﬁrst period for sure. During that
period of unitary length, all individuals work, and save some money to fund
their consumption during the second period, which is a period of retirement.
However, not all members of a cohort t will live the second period: only
a proportion φ
t
t+1 of generation t will do so (0 ≤ φ
t
t+1 ≤ 1).7 Moreover, the
survivors of generation t will enjoy a second period of length λ
t








t+1, Figure 2 shows the
survival curves for particular values of these. If λ
t
t+1 is equal to 0.5 (i.e. the
maximum length of life is 1.5), and if φ
t
t+1 i se q u a lt o0 . 7 5 ,t h ea r e ab e l o wt h e
survival curve is the square of side 1 and the rectangular of length 0.5 and of
height 0.75. However, if all individuals of generation t survive the ﬁrst period
(i.e. φ
t
t+1 =1 ), the area below the survival curve becomes a rectangular (of
6On the inﬂuence of customs on longevity, see Vallin et al (2002).
7Given that all members of a generation live the ﬁrst period entirely, this amounts to
assume that the risk of death is fully concentrated at the end of the period.
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Figure 2: Survival curves.
Hence, while φ
t
t+1 determines the heigth of the second rectangular, λ
t
t+1




t+1 is the well-known life expectancy
(i.e. the average length of life), whereas 1+ λ
t
t+1 constitutes what Vallin and
Berlinguer (2002) call the “limit-longevity”, that is, the maximum length of life
that can be lived by a member of a cohort.8
2.2 Consumption and savings
Consumption during the ﬁrst period, denoted by ct,i se q u a lt o :
ct =( 1− τ)wt − st (1)
where wt is the wage, τ is the tax rate, while st is saving. It is assumed that,
at the end of the ﬁrst period, each individual deposits his savings at a mutual
fund. The mutual fund invests these savings in capital, and garantees a gross
return equal to ˜ Rt+1 to the surviving old. The gross return ˜ Rt+1 is equal, under
perfect competition, to Rt+1/φ
t
t+1 (where Rt+1 denotes the return on invested
capital). For convenience, it is also supposed that a perfect annuities market
exists.
Each individual chooses the savings st maximizing expected lifetime utility.
Given that no one knows the actual proportion of survivors φ
t
t+1 and the actual
length of the second period λ
t
t+1, the saving decision is based on the longevity





under logarithmic utility, the problem is to choose st to maximize:
8Although simpliﬁed - a survival curve is here reduced to 2 variables - the present model
makes appear the dependence of life expectancy on the “limit-longevity”.




























(1 − τ)wt (3)
It appears here that the probability of survival and the length of the second
period have a positive - but declining - inﬂuence on the propensity to save.
2.3 Production and capital accumulation





where A is a productivity parameter (A>0), α is a parameter (0 <α<1),






The labour force Lt is supposed to grow at a constant rate n:9
Lt+1 = Lt(1 + n) (6)
Proﬁt maximization by ﬁrms implies:
wt = AKα
t (1 − α)L
−α









It is supposed that there is a full depreciation of capital.
The capital market equilibrium Kt+1 = Ltst implies
kt+1 =















9As Alessandro Cigno kindly pointed out to me, that assumption is, given the varying
longevity, quite strong. Extending this model to connect fertility to longevity is left to future
research.
72.4 Longevity
2.4.1 The proportion of survivors
The proportion of survivors φ
t
t+1 is supposed to be inﬂuenced by two factors.
On the one hand, it is aﬀected by the global level of economic development.
As it is widely acknowledged, richer countries are generally characterized by
better survival conditions than poor countries.10 However, as Dreze and Sen
(1989) and Anand and Ravallion (1993) emphasized, countries with the same
level of economic development are not equally good at converting wealth in
health, and public policies constitute an important channel by which the wealth
of Nations aﬀects the health of Nations. Thus, we shall distinguish here two
inﬂuences of wealth on φ
t
t+1: ﬁrst, the inﬂuence of prosperity independently
from public intervention, which is captured by the net wage ˜ wt (i.e. net of tax);
second, the inﬂuence of the government, through public expenditures denoted
by gt.11
On the other hand, φ
t
t+1 is also supposed to be aﬀected by the accumulated
stock of habits and common knowledge Ht on “how to live a healthy life”, which
can be regarded as a set of customs raising the probability to survive the ﬁrst
period.12 That set of habits may explain why two countries with the same level
of economic development and the same public policy do not necessarily exhibit
identical survival conditions. For convenience, Ht is supposed to correspond to
the proportion of survivors within the previous cohort (i.e. φ
t−1
t ).
Hence, a simple production function for φ
t













t + γ ˜ wt + δgt
1+γ ˜ wt + δgt
(10)
where B is the habits parameter, while γ and δ reﬂect the impacts of ˜ wt and gt
on φ
t
t+1. In the rest of this paper, it is supposed that the inﬂuence of habits is,
although non-negligible, weak (i.e. 0 <B<1), and that economic development
has a globally positive inﬂuence on φ
t
t+1 [i.e. (1 − τ)γ + τδ >0, where τ is the
tax rate], which seems to be, in the light of the empirical literature, a plausible
assumption.
Expression (10) exhibits several plausible properties. First of all, the ab-
solute impact of ˜ wt on φ
t
t+1 is, provided γ>0, positive, but declining with ˜ wt
and gt. The latter property is plausible, in the light of empirical evidence (see
Dreze and Sen, 1989) suggesting that public policy can serve as a substitute
for ˜ wt (unlike in Bhattacharya and Qiao, 2005, where public policy and private
wealth are complementary). Moreover, the impact of gt on φ
t
t+1 is, under δ>0,
positive, but declining with gt and ˜ wt. Finally, the inﬂuences of ˜ wt and gt on
10On this, see Pritchett and Summers (1996) for a panel data study.
11One should notice that the inﬂuence of economic development - independently of public
intervention - on survival conditions is usually diﬃcult to quantity. While prosperity seems
to lead to lower mortality at the micro-level (see Valkonen, 2002), economic development at
the macro-level may imply a deterioration of health (see Easterlin, 1999; Sartor, 2002).
12On the central inﬂuence of habits and customs on mortality, see Vallin et al (2002).
8φ
t
t+1 are here decreasing with φ
t−1
t ,r e ﬂecting that the impact of economic de-
velopment on survival conditions is likely to be lower when habits are stronger.
On the contrary, the positive inﬂuence of habits on φ
t
t+1 is falling with ˜ wt and
gt. This captures the intuition that it is at low ˜ wt and gt that habits may have
their largest impact on φ
t
t+1.
2.4.2 The length of the second period
The length λ
t
t+1 of the second period of life enjoyed by survivors is supposed to
be, throughout this Section, an exogenous constant λ (λ>0):
λ
t
t+1 = λ (11)
This assumption constitutes a strong simpliﬁcation: as demographers em-
phasized, the evolution of mortality over time has been such that not only has
a larger proportion of people reached high ages, but the maximum age at death
has also grown over time.13We shall thus endogenize λ
t
t+1 in the next Section.
2.5 Government
The government conﬁnes itself to collecting a tax τ on wages, and uses the
revenues from taxation to fund public policies gt increasing the proportion of
survivors of the ﬁrst period φ
t
t+1. Those policies can take various forms. For
instance, these can be public expenditures promoting security on roads.
We shall suppose that there is no possibility of public deﬁcit, so that:
τwt = gt (12)
2.6 Steady-states
Fixing kt+1 = kt in the capital accumulation equation (9) allows us to derive
the kk locus, along which capital per worker is constant:
k =
∙
A(1 − α)(1 − τ)βλφ
















2 > 0 (14)
The second-order derivative of the kk locus with respect to φ is:

















2 (1 + n)(1+βλφ)
3
(15)
where C ≡ A(1 − α)(1 − τ).




t in expression (10) allows us to derive









































(B − 1)−1α2 (−1+φ)
3 E
> 0 (18)
where E ≡ A(1−α)[γ(1−τ)+δτ]. Under the plausible assumption of a globally
positive impact of economic development on φ [i.e. γ(1 − τ)+δτ > 0], those
derivatives are strictly positive, so that the φφ l o c u si si n c r e a s i n ga n dc o n v e x .
The issue of the existence of a steady-state can be formulated as the question
of the existence of an intersection of the kk and φφ loci. It is straightforward
to see, on the basis of the kk and φφ loci, that the two loci intersect at (0,0).
Regarding the existence of another, non-trivial equilibrium, two cases should be
distinguished, depending on the value of α.
If α<1/2 (case 1), there must exist a unique non-trivial steady-state,
provided the global inﬂuence of economic development on φ is positive (see
Appendix A). Regarding the stability of that equilibrium, it is, under mild
conditions, locally stable (see Appendix B).
If α ≥ 1/2, there may or may not exist a non-trivial equilibrium: as it is
discussed in the Appendix, three cases should be distinguished: the existence
of a unique non-trivial equilibrium (case 2a); the existence of two non-trivial
equilibria (case 2b); the existence of no non-trivial equilibrium (case 2c).
Figure 3 illustrates those possible cases. On each graph, the φφ locus is the
convex curve tending to +∞ when φ tends to 1.
Figure 3: Equilibria in the simple model (A =2 0 , τ =0 .1, β =0 .99, λ =0 .8,
n =0 , γ =0 .1, δ =0 .3 and B =0 .5).
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Regarding the stability of non-trivial equilibria, one should notice that, in
cases 1 and 2a where there is a unique non-trivial steady-state, that equilibrium
is likely to be locally stable.14 To see this, it suﬃces to draw, on the phase
diagram, the vertical and horizontal arrows on each area deﬁned by the kk and
φφ loci. Given that k tends to decrease when it is higher than the kk locus, and
to increase below it, whereas φ tends to increase on the left of the φφ locus, and
to decrease on the right of it, it is clear that, around the non-trivial equilibrium,
all arrows are oriented towards this, suggesting that this is locally stable.
In case 2b, where the φφ and kk loci intersect twice (in addition to the trivial
steady-state), it is easy to see, if one draws the arrows in the areas deﬁned by
the loci, that the intermediate equilibrium is not stable (while the high steady-
state is). This observation is compatible with the existence of poverty traps:
some level of development must be reached before being able to beneﬁtf r o m
the positive dynamics and converge towards the high steady-state.
In case 2c, there exists no non-trivial equilibrium, and drawing the arrows
suggests that, in that case, the unique equilibrium (i.e. the origin of axes) is
stable. Such a catastrophic scenario can be explained by the fact that, when
14See Appendix B for a formal study of stability.
11α is large, 1 − α tends to zero, so that savings are low, which handicaps the
accumulation of capital, whatever longevity is. However, this incapacity to ac-
cumulate capital implies that high survival probabilities can be neither reached
nor sustained, so that both capital and survival can only converge towards zero.
2.7 Comparative statics
Let us now consider the eﬀect, on the steady-state values of k and φ,o fc h a n g i n g
one parameter ceteris paribus.T h o s ee ﬀects are summarized in Table 1.
Table 1: Comparative statics results










First of all, it is interesting to notice that, provided the global eﬀect of
prosperity on survival conditions is positive, the productivity parameter A and
the discount factor β have a positive eﬀect on both k∗ and φ
∗. Under the same
- plausible - assumption, the cohort growth rate n has a negative eﬀect not only
on k∗, but, also, on φ
∗. On the contrary, the length λ, by favouring savings,
raises the steady-state values of k and φ.
The parameters of the survival production function - i.e. B,γ,δ -a ﬀect the
steady-state φ positively. All this is hardly surprising: promoting the transmis-
sion of health-preserving customs and raising the productivity of public policies
can only increase φ,s od oa t t e m p t st om a k et h ed e v e l o p m e n tm o r e“ h e a l t h -
friendly” (i.e. raising γ). Moreover, given that φ aﬀects savings positively, such
changes also raise steady-state capital.
It is important to underline the unknown eﬀect of the tax rate τ on steady-
state k and φ. Whereas one may expect that raising τ reduces k∗,t h i si sn o t
necessarily the case, because a higher τ may raise k∗ indirectly, via the positive
eﬀect of φ on the propensity to save. Moreover, raising τ does not necessarily
raise φ
∗:ah i g h e rτ may slowdown capital accumulation, which may lead to a
lower φ
∗. Hence, a numerical application is required to sign the eﬀect of τ on
the steady-state.
2.8 Numerical application: the optimal long-run tax rate
Whereas k and φ can, under some assumptions, grow “hand-in-hand”, one
should nonetheless keep in mind that a trade-oﬀ may exist between survival
12conditions and capital accumulation. Raising φ
∗ is not costless, and may re-
quire a non-negligible sacriﬁce in terms of consumption. In order to illustrate
the potential trade-oﬀ between steady-state survival and consumption, we shall
proceed in three stages: we shall ﬁrst study the tax rate maximizing steady-
state survival, then, the tax rate maximizing steady-state capital per worker,
and, ﬁnally, the tax rate maximizing average steady-state utility. Results are
summarized in Table 2.
The tax rate maximizing steady-state φ, denoted by τ∗
φ, depends on the ratio
γ/δ, that is, on the relative “productivity” of each determinant of survival con-
ditions. This conﬁrms what the intuition suggests: the more survival-enhancing
economic development is “naturally”, the smaller is the need for governmental
intervention ceteris paribus. In the light of history, there can be no doubt that,
although economic expansion may aﬀect φ positively even without governmen-
tal intervention, targeted public programs are more productive, so that δ must
exceed γ.15 However, Table 2 suggests that, if one concentrates on long-run φ,
this higher productivity does not suﬃce to justify a strictly positive τ∗
φ: pub-
lic intervention requires a signiﬁcant productivity gap. For instance, given our
calibration, if δ i sf o u rt i m e sa sh i g ha sγ, τ∗
φ is 33 %, but if δ is only twice as
high as γ,t h e nτ∗
φ is zero. In the latter case, the natural impact of economic
development on φ is suﬃciently high compared to the inﬂuence of gt,s ot h a t
laissez-faire is optimal.
Table 2 also illustrates that the tax rate maximizing steady-state capital per
worker, denoted by τ∗
k,i sl o w e rt h a nτ∗
φ. However, even if one neglects survival
conditions, the optimal τ may still be strictly positive, for instance if economic
development has a negative “natural” impact on φ, or if its positive impact
on φ is too low compared to the one of public expenditures. This is explained
by the fact that φ aﬀects savings, so that, even if φ i sn o tv a l u e di ni t s e l f ,i t
may be worth intervening in the economy to guarantee a suﬃciently high φ.
Hence, the instrumental role of φ may suﬃce, in some circumstances, to justify
public intervention. One should also notice that τ∗
k is, ceteris paribus,s t r i c t l y
decreasing with the productivity of public spendings.
The tax rate maximizing steady-state utility, denoted by τ∗
u, lies, not surpris-
ingly, between τ∗
k and τ∗
φ. However, the gap between τ∗
k and τ∗
u, which exhibits
a kind of inverted-U shape (as a function of γ), invites additional comments.
First, one should notice that when γ tends to be negative, the gap between τ∗
k
and τ∗
u tends to be, ceteris paribus, smaller. The reason for this result lies in
the fact that, the lower γ is, the stronger is the need for intervening to sustain
φ - even if one concentrates on capital only - so that the attention paid to both
k and φ is stronger (although φ is then purely instrumental). Hence, the extent
by which the goals of maximizing long-run capital and long-run utility diﬀer is
smaller when γ is low, so that, in that case, τ∗
k tends to converge towards τ∗
u.
On the contrary, when γ becomes suﬃciently high, the instrumental value of φ
collapses, so that the goals of maximizing long-run utility and long-run capital
diﬀer now signiﬁcantly, which is reﬂected by a large gap between τ∗
k and τ∗
u.
15See Anand and Ravallion (1993).
13However, the latter statement does not imply that a higher γ increases neces-
sarily the gap between τ∗
k and τ∗
u:o n c eγ reaches some critical level with respect




Table 2: Optimal steady-state tax rates τ∗( A =2 0 , α =0 .5, β =0 .99,
n =0 ).





.75 .5 −.05 .26 03 63 7
.75 .5 −.01 .25 22 32 4
.75 .50.25 01 82 0
.75 .5 .01 .24 71 41 6
.75 .5 .025 .24 3 5 8
.75 .5 .035 .23 9 0 2
.75 .5 .05 .23 3 0 0
.75 .5 .075 .22 0 0 0
.75 .5 .085 .21 3 0 0
.75 .5 .1 .20 0 0
.25 .5 .075 .22 0 0 0
.5 .5 .075 .22 0 0 0
.75 .5 .075 .22 0 0 0
1 .5 .075 .22 0 0 0





.75 .5 .075 .1 5000
.75 .5 .075 .175 12 0 0
.75 .5 .075 .22 0 00
.75 .5 .075 .33 3 00
.75 .5 .075 .43 8 00
.75 .5 .075 .54 1 00
.75 .5 .075 .75 44 0 1
.75 .5 .075 .95 46 0 2
.75 .50 .35 0 1 5 1 7
.75 .5 −.01 .35 2 1 8 2 0
.75 .01 .075 .22 0 00
.75 .25 .075 .22 0 00
.75 .5 .075 .22 0 00
.75 .99 .075 .22 0 00
The second part of Table 2 also illustrates that, whereas τ∗
φ is determined
exclusively by the ratio γ/δ,t h i si sn o tt h ec a s ew i t hτ∗
u, which depends - as
τ∗
k -o nt h ev a l u e so fγ and δ, and not only on their ratio. Indeed, whereas the
optimal tax rate is 20 % under γ equal to 0 and δ equal to 0.2, τ∗
u is equal to
only 17 % once δ is equal to 0.3 (γ remaining ﬁxed). Hence, from the long-run
perspective, a rise in the productivity of the State implies necessarily a fall in the
size of the State: once this is more productive, keeping its size constant would
lead to a waste of resources and, in ﬁne, a waste of utility. This suggests that
τ∗
u is higher in countries where the State is less productive (e.g. in developing
countries).
To summarize, this short discussion emphasizes that the optimal tax rate
depends crucially on how “free” economic development and governmental inter-
vention aﬀect survival conditions. This conclusion does not constitute a surprise,
but, in the light of the lack of consensus of empirical studies on the determi-
nants of mortality, this conclusion highlights the diﬃculty to know whether
actual public policies are optimal from a long-run perspective. It is important
to stress that, for that purpose, knowing the extra-value added by public inter-
vention does not suﬃce. The estimation of τ∗
u requires additional information
on the “natural” inﬂuence of economic development, which remains hard to
estimate.16
16The natural inﬂuence of economic development on mortality is hard to quantify, because
143 Public policy with two instruments
Whereas Section 2 postulated that the maximum length of life 1+λ
t
t+1 is con-
stant over time, this assumption constitutes, in the light of history, a strong
simpliﬁc a t i o n :d u r i n gt h el a s tt w oc e n t u r i e s ,t h e r eh a sb e e nas t r o n gr i s en o t
only in the proportion of people reaching high ages, but, also, in the maximum
age at death.17 Hence, although there has been, in the industrialized world, a
strong rectangularization - i.e. φ
t
t+1 grew more strongly than λ
t
t+1 -t h e r ei sa
need for endogenizing λ
t
t+1. This task will allow us to examine the structure
of the optimal public intervention, between policies raising the proportion of
survivors φ
t
t+1 and policies increasing the maximum longevity 1+λ
t
t+1.
3.1 Endogenous maximum length of life
We shall now suppose that λ
t
t+1 is not constant, but can be aﬀected either by
the general prosperity, captured by the untaxed wage ˜ wt,o rb ys p e c i ﬁc public
policies (e.g. medical research against ageing diseases), denoted by rt.M o r e o v e r ,
we shall suppose that λ
t
t+1 can also be inﬂuenced by the accumulated stock of
common knowledge and habits on “how to live a long life”, approximated by the
length of the second period enjoyed by the previous generation λ
t−1
t .18 Hence,
we shall postulate that λ
t













t + ε ˜ wt + υrt
1+ε ˜ wt + υrt
(19)
where R is the habits parameter (0 <R<1), while ε and υ reﬂect the impact
of ˜ wt and rt on λ
t
t+1. The model in Section 2 corresponds to the case where
R =1 ,w h e r e a sε = υ =0. Here again, we shall suppose that economic
expansion has a globally positive inﬂuence on λ
t
t+1, which can be written as
ε(1 −τ)+υτ(1 −ψ) > 0,w h e r eψ denotes the share of rt in the public budget.
The length of the second period is, under ε,υ > 0,a ﬀected positively by ˜ wt
and rt, but at a declining rate. Moreover, ˜ wt and rt are competing channels
by which economic development can aﬀect the maximum length of life: the
inﬂuence of each of these is declining with the level of the other. One should
also notice that habits have a positive inﬂuence on λ
t
t+1, but declining with ˜ wt
and rt, which is plausible.
Whereas the modelling of λ
t
t+1 looks like the one of φ
t
t+1, the two processes
at work are likely to diﬀer signiﬁcantly. Actually, habits may play a stronger
role for λ
t
t+1 than for φ
t
t+1. The reason for this is that, among the main causes
of death for young adults, death by car accident and death by suicide are causes
for which there can be little dependency on past achievements, so that B is low
(and probably lower than R). Public expenditures programs favouring security
its impact on, among other things, the climate, the quality of air and water, are - although
measurable - not easily identiﬁable as the cause of mortality changes (see Sartor, 2002).
17See Wilmoth et al (2000) and Vallin and Berlinguer (2002).
18On the inﬂuence of habits and customs on the mortality at high ages, see Vallin et al
(2002).
15on roads must be re-spent every year, otherwise the number of accidents tends
to rise again. Hence, habits parameters B and R are likely to diﬀer signiﬁcantly.
3.2 Government
The government implements now two kinds of policies: on the one hand, public
expenditures gt aﬀecting the proportion of survivors within a generation; on
the other hand, “pure longevity” expenditures rt, which raise the length of
life enjoyed by survivors. Those expenditures can take various forms: medical
research against ageing diseases, various preventive programs, etc.
The government’s budget constraint is now:
τwt = gt + rt (20)
For convenience, we shall introduce the parameter ψ (0 ≤ ψ ≤ 1), which is
the share of the budget dedicated to policies aﬀecting φ
t
t+1, while the proportion
(1 − ψ) of the budget is dedicated to expenditures rt.
3.3 Steady-states
Within this extended model, the capital accumulation equation is:
kt+1 =















T h eu n i q u ed i ﬀerence with respect to the basic model is that the length of the
second period is no longer constant across generations.
As in the previous Section, ﬁxing kt+1 = kt allows us to derive the kk locus:
k =
µ
(1 − τ)(1 − α)Aβφλ




The kk locus gives us, for each combination of φ and λ,t h ev a l u eo fk such
that k is constant. The length λ is no longer ﬁxed here, so that the kk locus is
not a curve in the (φ,k) space, but a plane in the (φ,k,λ) space.






t + γ(1 − τ)(1 − α)Akα
t + δτψ(1 − α)Akα
t
1+γ(1 − τ)(1 − α)Akα
















We shall, as in Section 2, make the plausible postulate that the global impact
of economic development on φ
t
t+1 is strictly positive.19











t + ε(1 − τ)(1 − α)Akα
t + υτ(1 − ψ)(1 − α)Akα
t
1+ε(1 − τ)(1 − α)Akα
t + υτ(1 − ψ)(1 − α)Akα
t
(25)













The question of the existence of an equilibrium, which could, in the basic
model, be formulated as the search for an intersection of the kk and φφ loci in
the 2-dimensional space (φ,k), must now be reformulated as the question of the
intersection of the loci kk, φφ and λλ in the 3-dimensional space (φ,k,λ).I n
order to connect the present framework with the basic model, the three loci are,
in Figure 5, represented as a collection of curves.
Actually, the basic model can be regarded as a particular case of the present
one, where the selection of a speciﬁcv a l u ef o rλ amounts to “choose”, from the
kk plane shown in the ﬁrst graph of Figure 5, a single c u r v ea m o n gt h eo n e s
constituting the kk locus. In a similar way, a single curve was selected from the
φφ plane (see the second graph). Having selected those curves, corresponding
to the kk and φφ loci for a speciﬁc λ, one could then discuss the possibility of
their intersection.
Figure 5: The kk, φφ and λλ loci in the (φ,λ,k) space (A =2 0 , α =0 .5,











In order to discuss the existence issue in the present framework, one strategy
consists of deriving the equations describing the intersection of the kk locus with,
on the one hand, the φφ locus, and, on the other hand, the λλ locus. Given that
20That assumption is (ε(1 − τ)+υτ(1 − ψ)) > 0.
17the ﬁrst derived curve provides us, for diﬀerent values of λ, the combinations
of k and φ such that k and φ are constant, while the second curve provides
us, for diﬀerent values of φ, the combinations of k and λ that are constant,
an equilibrium would lie at the intersection of those two curves, because an
equilibrium point must, by deﬁnition, belong to the three loci. To illustrate
this strategy, Figure 6 puts on the same graph the three loci from Figure 5.
Those loci intersect not only at the origin, but also at another point, which is a
non-trivial equilibrium.
Figure 6: Existence of an equilibrium (A =2 0 , α =0 .5, β =0 .99, τ =0 .25,
ψ =0 .5, B =0 .5, γ =0 .1, δ =0 .3, R =0 .5, ε =0 .1, υ =0 .3)
k
longevity survival
Regarding the conditions guaranteeing the existence of a non-trivial equi-
librium, it is shown in the Appendix that, provided economic expansion has a
globally positive inﬂuence on each aspect of longevity, the condition α<1/3
guarantees the existence of a non-trivial steady-state. Moreover, that condition
guarantees also the unicity of the non-trivial equilibrium.
However, if that condition is not satisﬁed (i.e. α ≥ 1/3), neither the existence
nor the unicity of a non-trivial steady-state is guaranteed: one may have no non-
trivial steady-state, or, alternatively, several non-trivial equilibria may exist.
Let us ﬁrst consider a case of non-existence. For that purpose, let us, for
instance, suppose that α is 0.4, τ is 0.9, while ψ is 0.99. Whereas Section 2
suggests that, under that calibration, a non-trivial equilibrium must exist under
an exogenous λ (λ>0), this is no longer true once λ is endogenous. To see
this, let us ﬁrst present, on two distinct graphs, the intersections between, on
the one hand, the kk and φφ loci, and, on the other hand, between the kk and
λλ loci.
Figure 7: Non-existence of a non-trivial steady-state (A =2 0 , α =0 .4,
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The left graph of Figure 7 illustrates clearly that, for a ﬁxed, non-zero value
of λ, there must exist a non-trivial equilibrium. Actually, as it was stressed
above, ﬁxing λ amounts to select a single curve from the myriad of curves con-
stituting the kk locus, and, similarly, the single curve corresponding to the same
value of λ from the φφ locus. It is straightforward to see that, provided the se-
lected λ is strictly positive, the two selected curves - i.e. the kk and φφ loci
from the previous Section - necessarily intersect at a non-trivial equilibrium.
Nonetheless, there exists no non-trivial equilibrium in the extended model, be-
cause the curve deﬁned by the intersection of the kk and λλ loci, which is
illustrated on the second graph of Figure 7, only intersects the curve deﬁned by
the intersection of the kk and φφ loci at the origin of axes. Therefore, there is
no non-trivial intersection of the three loci, so that no non-trivial equilibrium
exists.
While the above numerical example is extreme, it suﬃces to illustrate that,
once λ
t
t+1 is endogenous, the existence of a non-trivial equilibrium is no longer
guaranteed by the conditions stated in the basic model, so that stronger condi-
tions are required. That stronger, suﬃcient condition is that α<1/3,s ot h a ta
less capital-intensive production process is required to guarantee the existence
of a non-trivial equilibrium. The intuition behind that stronger condition is the
following: once λ
t
t+1 is endogenous, the economy’s take-oﬀ becomes more dif-
ﬁcult, so that, in order to avoid stagnation, a less capital-intensive production
process is required.
Regarding the unicity issue, it should be stressed that the extended model
does not necessarily lead to a unique non-trivial equilibrium. Actually, the three
loci may intersect at several points, as shown by Figure 8.
Figure 8: Multiple equilibria (A =2 0 , α =0 .7, β =0 .99, τ =0 .25, ψ =0 .5,
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Having discussed the existence and unicity of an equilibrium, we can now
discuss brieﬂy its stability. Given that the stability issue was studied in depth in
the basic model, we shall conﬁne ourselves here to an intuitive discussion in the
light of phase diagrams. Let us suppose that a non-trivial equilibrium exists, as
on Figure 6. To see why that equilibrium is likely to be stable, one can draw,
as in the 2-dimensional case, the horizontal and vertical arrows describing the
dynamics of the economy outside the three loci. Given that the vertical arrows
are directed upwards below the kk locus, and downwards above the kk locus,
and given that the directions pointed to by the horizontal arrows associated
to the φφ and λλ loci, the non-trivial equilibrium, if it exists, is likely to be
locally stable. A similar procedure can be used to show that, under multiple
non-trivial equilibria, the intermediate equilibrium is locally unstable. However,
it should be reminded that such a diagram-based analysis is only an intuitive
way to discuss the stability: in cases where the non-trivial equilibrium is close
to the origin of axes, its stability, even local, depends also on the stability of
zero, so that a formal analysis is required.
3.4 Comparative statics
Let us now consider the impact of various parameters on the steady-state. Table
3, which summarizes those eﬀects, invites three remarks.
Firstly, the parameters A, β and n,w h i c ha ﬀect the accumulation of capital
directly, also inﬂuence the steady-state levels of φ and λ in the same directions.
This indirect inﬂuence follows from the postulated endogeneity of φ and λ:w h e n
an economy accumulates more capital, this has here a positive inﬂuence on φ
[provided γ(1 − τ)+δψτ > 0], and on λ [provided ε(1 − τ)+υ(1 − ψ)τ>0].
Therefore, any factor favouring capital accumulation also raises φ
∗ and λ
∗.
Secondly, the parameters entering the survival production function - i.e. γ,δ
and B - do not only aﬀect φ
∗ positively, but, also, via their positive eﬀect
on capital accumulation, λ
∗. For instance, if public expenditures promoting
security on roads become more productive in terms of φ (i.e. δ is raised), this
will also raise k∗ and λ
∗. This indirect inﬂuence comes from the savings decision:
more security on roads increases the probability to live the second period, which
makes individuals save more, which leads to a higher output, and, in ﬁne, to a
higher longevity.
20Table 3: Comparative statics results
Parameter Eﬀect on k∗ Eﬀect on φ













Thirdly, it should be stressed that, exactly as in the basic model, the inﬂu-
ence of public policy parameters τ and ψ on the steady-state is unknown.
The unknown impact of τ follows from the fact that taxation has, as in
the basic framework, two opposite eﬀects on capital accumulation: on the one
hand, a higher τ, by shrinking the share of the wage available for savings, tends
to slowdown capital accumulation; on the other hand, if one supposes that
governmental intervention brings some extra-value as far as survival conditions
are concerned, a higher τ leads to a rise in φ and λ, which promotes capital
accumulation. Hence, those opposite eﬀects imply that the impact of raising τ
on steady-state capital is unknown. But, given that φ and λ are also inﬂuenced
by the untaxed wage, the eﬀect of τ on their levels is also unknown: a higher τ
does not necessarily lead to a higher longevity.
Finally, one should notice that the impact of ψ on the steady-state is un-
known: in some cases, a higher proportion ψ of the government’s budget allo-
cated to survival expenditures gt may aﬀect the steady-state positively, whereas
it may have, in other cases, a negative eﬀect on not only k∗and λ
∗,b u t ,a l s o ,
on φ
∗. The reason why such a surprising result may occur is that changing
ψ amounts to move the φφ and λλ loci in opposite directions (while the kk
locus remains unchanged). Hence, given that the steady-state φ
∗ depends also
on where the λλ locus lies, an optimal policy requires some kind of “balance”
between the two kinds of public programs, balance whose precise form depends
on the parameters determining φ and λ.
3.5 Numerical application: the optimal long-run policy
Let us now study, by means of a simple numerical application, the deﬁnition of
the optimal allocation of the public budget between, on the one hand, spendings
gt,a ﬀecting the proportion of survivors φ
t
t+1, and, on the other hand, expen-
ditures rt, which raise the maximum length of life 1+λ
t
t+1. For that purpose
(selecting the optimal ψ), we shall make two restrictions.
21Firstly, we shall focus on the optimal long-run public policy, i.e., the policy
maximizing the steady-state utility of a representative agent.21 Such a focus on
the steady-state is a simpliﬁcation, because it ignores the welfare of all genera-
tions living before the steady-state is reached. However, given that the steady-
state is, by deﬁnition, the state where the economy will remain forever once it
has been reached, analyzing optimal public policy from that point of view is
deﬁnitely relevant.22
Secondly, we shall examine the question of the optimal long-run ψ for a given
ﬁscal capacity, that is, for a ﬁxed τ. While this restriction is non-negligible, one
should not exaggerate its strength: it is straightforward to imagine a situation
where, because of political hysteresis, the ﬁscal pressure cannot be changed.
In order to study the optimal ψ, we shall proceed in two stages. In a ﬁrst





t+1 in an identical manner. Then, we shall consider the -
more realistic - case where development is not neutral.
Under a neutral development, there are potentially two factors determining
the optimal long-run ψ: on the one hand, the “productivities” of the two kinds
of public expenditures gt and rt, and, on the other hand, the diﬀerences in the
corresponding dependency on the past.
The crucial impact of the productivities on ψ
∗is illustrated by Table 4, under
the assumption of identical habits parameters (B = R =0 .5)a n dan e u t r a l ,
but weakly positive, development (γ = ε =0 .05). When the productivities
of the two public spendings are equal, then, given that the two production
processes are exactly identical, the optimal ψ is 50 %.23 Nevertheless, this case




t+1 is not equally diﬃcult: the proportion
of survivors of the ﬁrst period is far easier to raise than maximum longevity.
As Table 4 illustrates, introducing some productivity gap does not leave ψ
∗
unchanged. Reducing υ tends, ceteris paribus,t ol e a dt oah i g h e rψ
∗, suggesting
that it is desirable to spend more where the productivity is higher. However,
one should notice that, even when the impact of rt on λ
t
t+1 b e c o m e sa sl o wa s
the “natural” impact of economic development, it is still desirable to dedicate
as i g n i ﬁcant part of the budget to rt. The intuition behind that result goes





in a symmetric way, some “balance” is always required between the resources
dedicated to φ
t
t+1 and to λ
t
t+1, because these are equally important for welfare.
21Given that the postulated parameters do not guarantee the uniqueness of a steady-state,
it is important to stress that ψ∗ is here deﬁned as the one maximizing the utility at the upper
steady-state. Focussing on the upper steady-state amounts to suppose that this equilibrium
can be reached given the initial conditions. However, the selected parameters always lead to
an extremely low intermediate equilibrium, so that assuming that initial conditions are such
that the poverty trap is avoided constitutes a weak postulate.
22O n es h o u l da l s on o t i c et h a tf o c u s s i n go nt h es t e a d y - s t a t ea l l o w su st oa v o i dt h ep o s s i b i l i t y
of a diﬀerence between ex ante and ex post average lifetime utility (such a diﬀerence occurs
outside the steady-state, because the actual values of λt
t+1 and φt
t+1 diﬀer from their expected
values outside the steady-state).
23This result follows from the fact that φt
t+1and λt
t+1 a r et r e a t e di nt h es a m ew a yi nt h e
utility function of the representative agent, for whom life expectancy, equal to 1+(φt
t+1λt
t+1),
is the unique thing that matters from a demographic point of view.
22Table 4: Optimal ψ (A =2 0 ,α=0 .5,β=0 .99,τ=0 .25)
γδ Bε υR ψ
∗(%)
0.05 0.30 .50 .05 0.30 .55 0
0.05 0.30 .50 .05 0.20 .55 2
0.05 0.30 .50 .05 0.10 .56 5
0.05 0.30 .50 .05 0.075 0.57 4
0.05 0.30 .50 .05 0.05 0.59 1
Whereas Table 4 emphasized that diﬀerences in the productivity of public
policies aﬀect ψ





should be stressed that the latter assumption is quite restrictive. Actually, as
it was argued above, there exist good reasons to believe that the impact of the
past is stronger in the determination of λ
t
t+1 than in the determination of φ
t
t+1.
For instance, the major causes of death for young adults - car accidents and
suicides - can hardly be aﬀected by past achievements, so that the inﬂuence of
the past may, for φ
t
t+1,b el o w e rt h a nf o rλ
t
t+1.
As one may expect, diﬀerences in the degree of dependence on the past
can hardly leave ψ
∗ unaﬀected. That intuition is conﬁr m e db yT a b l e5 :o n c ea
diﬀerential in accumulation factors is introduced in favour of λ
t




∗ becomes signiﬁcantly higher. It is, for instance, as high as 71 % under B
equal to 0.5 and R equal to 0.6, against only 65 % under an identical dependence
on the past (see Table 4). Not surprisingly, stronger diﬀerences in the degree of
dependence on past achievements lead to higher ψ
∗. But more surprising is that,
under R equal to 90 %, the optimal policy is to spend exclusively on φ
t
t+1.T h i s
follows from the conjunction of the positive natural inﬂuence of development on
λ
t
t+1 with strong customs, which makes public intervention unnecessary from a
long-run perspective.
While it was supposed so far that economic development is neutral, in the




t+1 in a similar manner, such a neutrality lacks
empirical support. Actually, even though it is hard to separate the contribu-
tions of each - private and public - factor on longevity, the “natural” inﬂuence
of economic development on φ
t
t+1 is likely to have been signiﬁcantly stronger
than its inﬂuence on λ
t
t+1, as suggested by the historical fact that, at periods
of limited public intervention, longevity progress began with a strong fall in
mortality at low ages, before aﬀecting mortality at all ages.24
As illustrated by Table 6, introducing an asymmetry in the natural impact




t+1 is not without consequences on ψ
∗.25 If, for
instance, one reduces ε from 0.05 to 0.04, everything else remaining unchanged
with respect to Table 4, ψ
∗ falls from 65 % to 54 %. Reducing ε further tends
to lead to even lower values of ψ
∗. The tendency of ψ
∗ towards 0 when ε tends
to 0 is not surprising: once the natural impact of prosperity on the maximum
24See Vallin and Berlinguer (2002).
25For the convenience of the presentation, B and R are now equal as in Table 4.
23length of life becomes very small, public intervention becomes the unique way
to improve λ
t
t+1, so that the optimal budget is strongly unbalanced in favour of
the aspect of longevity that cannot be improved without public intervention.
Table 5: Optimal ψ (A =2 0 ,α=0 .5,β=0 .99,τ=0 .25)
γδ Bευ R ψ
∗(%)
0.05 0.30 .50 .05 0.10 .67 1
0.05 0.30 .50 .05 0.10 .78 0
0.05 0.30 .40 .05 0.10 .78 6
0.05 0.30 .50 .05 0.10 .89 4
0.05 0.30 .50 .05 0.10 .9 100
Hence, Table 6 suggests that, even though some public policies may be more
eﬃcient than others, what is crucial, at the end of the day, for the determina-
tion of ψ
∗, is the precise extent by which each longevity aspect can grow without
governmental intervention. If one has good reasons to believe that the length
of the second period λ
t
t+1 is likely to be less easily raised, without public inter-
vention, than the proportion of survivors φ
t
t+1,t h i sj u s t i ﬁes, from a long-run
perspective, a larger share of the budget to be spent on policies raising λ
t
t+1,
even if the productivity of such policies is lower. Thus, all this tends to cast
some doubts on the ψ
∗ derived under neutral economic development (Table 4).
Table 6: Optimal ψ (A =2 0 ,α=0 .5,β=0 .99,τ=0 .25)
γδ Bευ R ψ
∗(%)
0.05 0.30 .50 .04 0.10 .55 4
0.05 0.30 .50 .03 0.10 .54 3
0.05 0.30 .50 .02 0.10 .53 2
0.05 0.30 .50 .01 0.10 .52 2
0.05 0.30 .50 .005 0.10 .51 7
Having studied the impact of a non-neutral development, we can now re-
introduce diﬀerences in past-dependency, in order to examine the optimal policy






As Table 7 conﬁrms, introducing diﬀerences in the degree of dependence on
past longevity achievements aﬀects ψ
∗ signiﬁcantly. For instance, under ε equal
to 0.03, a rise in R from 0.5 to 0.7 raises ψ
∗ from 43 % à 54 %. Moreover, under
24ε equal to 0.01, raising R from 0.5 to 0.8 makes ψ
∗ grow from 22 % to 29 %.
However, Table 7 suggests that the mere existence of a stronger dependence on
the past for λ
t
t+1 does not suﬃce, in itself, to justify an “unbalanced” budget
structure favouring expenditures of kind gt over expenditures of type rt.
Table 7: Optimal ψ (A =2 0 ,α=0 .5,β=0 .99,τ=0 .25)
γδ Bευ R ψ
∗(%)
0.05 0.30 .50 .03 0.10 .75 4
0.05 0.30 .50 .01 0.10 .72 9
0.05 0.30 .50 .01 0.10 .83 6
0.05 0.30 .30 .01 0.10 .84 3
0.05 0.30 .10 .01 0.10 .84 7
As shown by the last line of Table 7, even if one postulates that the past-
dependency is, for λ
t
t+1,8t i m e sa ss t r o n ga sf o rφ
t
t+1, the optimal allocation
of public budget is still close to 50-50. Although this result is obtained under





smaller diﬀerences could not, however, suﬃce to justify extremely unbalanced
budget structures.
Hence, this numerical exercise tends to question the optimality, from a long-
run perspective, of strongly unbalanced public budgets favouring expenditures
oriented towards the proportion of survivors over expenditures enhancing the
maximum length of life. If one concentrates on the steady-state, it is hard to see
how an extremely unbalanced budget could be justiﬁed. Given that, under the




t+1 matter equally for
the welfare of the representative agent, the competing eﬀects at work suggest
that the optimal budget structure should be, at least to some extent, balanced.
4C o n c l u s i o n s
The aim of this paper was to examine the deﬁnition of the optimal long-run
public intervention in a two-period OLG model where the proportion of survivors
of the ﬁrst period and the length of the second period can be aﬀected by distinct
public policies. For that purpose, we proceeded in two stages.
The presentation of the basic model - where the maximum length of life is
ﬁx e d-a l l o w e du st od i s c u s st h eq u e s t i o no ft h eo p t i m a lsize of public interven-
tion. As one may expect, the model suggests that, from a long-run perspective,
there exists an optimal size of the State, which depends on the extra-value
brought by public expenditures as far as the improvement of survival conditions
is concerned. It may be the case that the natural impact of economic expansion
25on survival conditions is so positive that laissez-faire is optimal. However, if
development aﬀects survival conditions negatively, a much larger public inter-
vention is justiﬁed.
The extended model, where the maximum length of life is endogenous, al-
lowed us to examine the optimal structure of public intervention. The optimal
allocation of public resources - for a ﬁxed ﬁscal pressure - was shown to depend
on the productivities of the diﬀerent policies, on the “natural” impact of eco-
nomic development on these, and, also, on the degree of dependence on past
achievements. It was argued that those diﬀerent determinants play in oppo-
site directions, so that, given the equal importance, in welfare terms, of the
proportion of survivors and the maximum longevity, the optimal public budget
should be relatively “balanced” between survival-enhancing policies and pro-
grams raising the maximum age at death. Actually, whereas the latter kind of
spendings may be less productive than the former, and habits mechanisms prob-
ably stronger for the maximum length of life, those two considerations, which
support a larger budget share dedicated to survival-enhancing expenditures, are
- at least partly - counter-balanced by the fact that the natural inﬂuence of eco-
nomic expansion on mortality at lower ages is generally larger than on mortality
at higher ages, which justiﬁes some balance in the budget.
Finally, it cannot be overemphasized here that this paper is only a ﬁrst step
in the study of the optimal public policy under endogenous longevity. Actually,
the present study focussed on the long-run, and, thus, excluded all generations
living before the steady-state is reached. Given that the well-being of people
living in the transition is also worth being taken into account, and given that
the transition may be quite long, it would be interesting to include generations
living during the transition, and to discuss the sensitivity of the optimal public
intervention to the postulated concept of intergenerational justice.
Moreover, while this study emphasized that the optimal long-run policy
depends on how economic development aﬀects mortality, it should be stressed
that other factors may also inﬂuence the optimal public intervention. Among
other things, the precise form of individual preferences may also play a crucial
role. Whereas we postulated a utility function where φ and λ are treated in a
symmetric way, such an assumption may be unrealistic: individuals may exhibit
what Bommier (2003) calls “net” risk-aversion with respect to the length of life.
Such an attitude, by implying a diﬀerent weighting of φ and λ,m a ya ﬀect
the structure of the optimal intervention. The optimal policy is also likely to
be signiﬁcantly sensitive to the postulated social welfare function (which was
here the standard average view), and, especially, to the associated concerns for
intragenerational inequality and numbers. Another factor that may inﬂuence
the optimal public intervention consists of institutions, such as pensions schemes
(see Pestieau et al, 2006). Hence, much work remains to be done in the future.
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6A p p e n d i x
6.1 Appendix A: Existence of steady-states in the basic
model
Let us ﬁrst rewrite the φφ locus as:
φ =
Ekα
Ekα +( 1− B)
(27)
where E ≡ A(1 − α)((1 − τ)γ + τδ). Given our assumptions (A>0, 0 <α<1
and (1 − τ)γ + τδ >0), E is strictly positive.

















Let us now denote the right-hand side of the above expression by G(φ).
Proving the existence of an equilibrium amounts to ﬁnd a ﬁxed point of G(φ),
that is, a value of φ such that G(φ)=φ. It is clear that 0 is such a ﬁxed point.
But we would like to show that, provided α<1/2,a tl e a s to n eother ﬁxed point
28- corresponding to a non-trivial equilibrium - must exist. For that purpose, we
shall show that the function G(φ) satisﬁes the following properties:26
(i) G(0) = 0
(ii) G0(φ) ≥ 0 ∀φ ∈ [0,1]
(iii) limφ→1 G(φ)/φ < 1































































































=+ ∞ iﬀ α<1/2
26This part of the proof follows a method proposed by Chakraborty (2004).
29One can now see that, provided α<1/2, limφ→0 G0(φ) is inﬁnite, so that,
given (i), (ii) and (iii), the function G(φ) must intersect the 45◦ line at least once
on the [0,1] interval. Hence, in that case, at least one non-trivial equilibrium
must exist. Figure 10 makes appear the crucial role played by condition (iv),
which insures us that G(φ) must be above the 45◦ line in the neighbourhhood
of 0, so that, given that G(1) < 1, it is clear that a ﬁxed point must exist.
Figure 10: Fixed-point under α<1/2 (A =2 0 , τ =0 .1, β =0 .99, λ =0 .8,
n =0 , γ =0 .1, δ =0 .3 and B =0 .5)










Case 1: α =0 .4
Moreover, in the light of the expression of G0(φ),i ti sa l s op o s s i b l et oc l a i m
with certainty that such a non-trivial equilibrium must be unique. Indeed, it is
straightforward to see that, provided α<1/2,i n c r e a s i n gφ implies a decrease of
the ﬁrst factor of G0(φ). Moreover, the numerator of the second factor of G0(φ)
decreases when φ increases, while its denominator increases, so that the second
factor must also necessarily fall when φ increases. Hence, one can conclude
from this that G0(φ) is, under α<1/2, decreasing with φ, so that the non-
trivial equilibrium is, in that case, unique.
However, if α ≥ 1/2,t h elimφ→0 G0(φ)=0 , so that it is not clear whether a
non-trivial equilibrium exists or not. Three sub-cases should be distinguished.
These are illustrated on Figure 13.
On the one hand, if the G(φ) curve lies slightly above the 45◦ line in the
neighbourhood of zero, we know that there must exist a non-trivial equilibrium,
because G(φ) tends to a value strictly lower than unity when φ tends to 1, so
that the G(φ) curve must necessarily, in that case, intersect the 45◦ line on the
[0,1] interval.
On the other hand, if the G(φ) curve lies below the 45◦ line in the neigh-
bourhood of zero, it is not clear whether a non-trivial equilibrium exists: two
sub-cases should be distinguished. Firstly, it may be the case that the G(φ)
curve intersects the 45◦ line once from below, and then a second time from
above (which must be the case here, because G(1) < 1). This case is possible,
30because, as we saw above, under α ≥ 1/2,t h eG(φ) curve is not necessarily con-
cave over the entire interval. Secondly, it is also possible that the G(φ) curve
remains below the 45◦ line over the entire [0,1] interval, so that no non-trivial
equilibrium exists.
Figure 11: Fixed-points under α ≥ 1/2 (A =2 0 , τ =0 .1, β =0 .99, λ =0 .8,
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Case 2c: α =0 .9
6.2 Appendix B: Stability of steady-states in the basic
model
While the discussion of the stability of equilibria carried out in Section 2 in
the light of phase diagrams suggested that non-trivial equilibria are likely to
be stable (except the intermediate equilibrium), a more formal study of the
stability is nonetheless required, because phase diagrams can sometimes simplify
the picture signiﬁcantly.
To discuss the stability of equilibria, let us ﬁr s tn o t i c et h a tt h ep r e s e n t
system is non-linear, so that the conventional analysis of the Jacobian matrix
(composed of the ﬁrst-order derivatives of dynamic equations with respect to
state variables) can only inform us on the stability of equilibria provided these
are hyperbolic. Actually, if a ﬁxed-point is hyperbolic, the Hartman-Grobman
Theorem states that the stability of the linearized system (or its non-stability)
implies the local stability of the non-linear system (or its non-stability) (see
Medio and Lines, 2001). However, if the ﬁxed-point is not hyperbolic, then the
analysis of the linearized system does not allow us to draw any conclusion on
the local stability of the non-linear system.
As stated in Medio and Lines (2001), ﬁxed-points are, in discrete-time sys-
tems, hyperbolic if none of the eigenvalues of the Jacobian matrix, evaluated at
the equilibrium, is equal to 1 in modulo.
To discuss the hyperbolicity of non-trivial equilibria, let us ﬁrst compute the


















































t +( 1− α)Akα
t (γ(1 − τ)+δτ)
1+( 1− α)Akα
t (γ(1 − τ)+δτ)
(31)





































(1 − α)Aα((1 − τ)γ + δτ)kα
t (1 − Bφ)
kt (−1 − Akα











t ((1 − τ)γ + δτ)(1 − α)
¸
> 0 (35)
An equilibrium is hyperbolic if no eigenvalue of the Jacobian matrix, evalu-
ated at the equilibrium, is equal to 1 in modulo. A suﬃcient condition for this
hyperbolicity condition is that the trace of the Jacobian matrix (i.e. the sum
of eigenvalues) is positive but strictly lower than 1, and that the determinant
of the Jacobian matrix (i.e. the product of eigenvalues) is positive but strictly
lower than one.
Actually, it is easy to see that those conditions are also suﬃcient conditions
for the local stability of the equilibrium, which requires that all eigenvalues of
the Jacobian matrix are strictly lower than 1 in modulo.
These two conditions imply that, at the equilibrium (k∗,φ
∗):





















Regarding condition (*), the positivity of the sum in question is obvious.
Hence (*) can be reformulated as:
(1 − α)(1− τ)Ak∗α−1αβλ
φ∗
(1+n)(1+βλφ∗) < 1 − B
1+Ak∗α(γ(1−τ)+δτ)(1−α)
which is likely to be satisﬁed when the equilibrium is reached at a high level
of capital.























which is, here again, a plausible condition if the equilibrium considered is
characterized by suﬃciently high φ. Actually, given that the two factors on
the right-hand side are smaller than unity, the above condition is likely to be
satisﬁed provided B is suﬃciently large.
Regarding the second part of condition (**), it implies that:




Given that all factors on the left-hand side are - except A - smaller than 1 by
hypothesis, and that the right-hand side is clearly higher than 1, this condition
is likely to be satisﬁed, especially when k∗ is high.
To conclude, the present discussion of the stability of the equilibrium sug-
gests that this stability cannot be fully guaranteed in all cases. However, as
it was shown, the equilibrium is likely to be stable when it corresponds to a
suﬃciently high combination of k∗ and φ
∗. The reason for this is simple: be-
ing distant from the other equilibrium - i.e. the (0,0) point - insures stability,
whereas an equilibrium that is close to the (0,0) is likely to be unstable.
336.3 Appendix C: Existence of steady-states in the extended
model
In order to derive the conditions guaranteeing the existence of a non-trivial
steady-state, we shall follow here the technique used in Appendix A.





where V ≡ A(1 −α)(γ(1 −τ)+δψτ). Given the assumptions A>0, 0 <α<1
and γ(1 − τ)+δψτ > 0, it follows that V must be strictly positive.





where W ≡ A(1 − α)(ε(1 − τ)+υ(1 − ψ)τ). Here again, W>0.



























If we denote the right-hand side as the function H(k), the question of the
existence of an equilibrium becomes the search for a ﬁxed point of H(k).I ti s
clear that 0 is a ﬁxed point. But we would like to derive conditions guaranteeing
the existence of another ﬁxed point.
For that purpose, we shall follow the method proposed in the Appendix A
and show that the function H(k) satisﬁes the properties (i)-(iv), that is:
(i) H(0) = 0
(ii) H0(k) ≥ 0 ∀k ∈ [0,¯ k]
(iii) limk→¯ k H(k)/k < 1









(ii) To show this, we shall assume that there exists an upper bound steady-
state k,d e n o t e db y¯ k, i.e. a value of k that the steady-state capital never
exceeds. Given that the postulated Cobb-Douglas production function satisﬁes
the Inada conditions, there can be no doubt that such an upper bound exists.
Moreover, that upper bound is independent from φ and λ. Throughout this






34In the interval [0,¯ k],t h eﬁrst-order derivative of H with respect to k has,










α kαW(1 − B)
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which is a mild condition.
(iii) When k tends to ¯ k,t h elimk→¯ k H(k)/k is:
limk→¯ k H(k)/k =

Aβ(1−α)(1−τ)(limk→¯ k φ)(limk→¯ k λ)








given that φ and λ are bounded by 1 (i.e. their values when k → +∞), the
above ratio remains inferior to 1 as required.

































where Z ≡ V (1 − B)W (1 − R). It is straightforward to see that, when k
tends to zero, H0(k) tends to +∞ provided α<α ∗ =1 /3.
By the same rationale as in the basic case, it appears that, under α<1/3,
a non-trivial equilibrium must exist: the function H(k) must intersect the 45◦




. However, for α ≥ 1/3,o n ec a n n o tb e
sure that a non-trivial equilibrium exists.
Regarding the unicity issue, one can see, from the above expression, that,
under α<1/3, H00(k) is strictly negative, so that H is concave, which implies
that the non-trivial equilibrium must be, under that condition, unique.
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